The development of the criminal sanctioning track in the EU is a prominent policy issue. Previous studies of the actual use of criminal sanctions in the member states are very important since the gap between the law and practice can be very wide. Policy makers and law enforcers are confronted with a lack of empirical data on the actual use of criminal law to sanction environmental offenses. In this study, we use information stored in the Environmental
Introduction
In the past twenty years, the institutions of the European Union (EU) have been placing increasing emphasis on the effective enforcement of the framework of environmental European legislation. The case law of the European Court of Justice constitutes a cornerstone of this development. In the milestone "Greek Maize" case of 1989, the Court established the obligation of the Member States to ensure that infringements of EU-based national legislation "are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive"
1 . In the last decade or so, the use of criminal law is increasingly considered to be a necessity by EU institutions to further this environmental enforcement policy.
In light of the development of the criminal sanctioning track in the EU, studies of the actual use of criminal sanctions in the Member States are very important. The gap between the law and practice can be very wide. For instance, the legally stipulated maximum prison sentences and fines tell little about the actual prison sentences and fines imposed. At the EUlevel, as well as in the EU Member States, policy makers and law enforcers are confronted with a serious lack of empirical case-level data 2 on the actual use of criminal law to sanction environmental offenses (Rousseau, 2009; Faure, 2010; Faure & Svatikova, 2012) . The lack of information is a serious handicap for policy development since the EU has committed to developing policies based on evidence 3 ; information on the actual use of criminal law represents one important type of evidence.
However, in Belgium a complete record is available for the environmental sanctioning by public prosecutors and criminal courts in the provinces of East and West Flanders, and by administrative authorities in Brussels. This record of environmental sanctioning is stored in the Environmental LawForce database 4 . Parts of this extensive dataset have previously been used to study the use of non-monetary sanctions by lower criminal courts against corporate environmental offenders (Blondiau & Rousseau, 2010) , to explore the use of prison sentences by lower criminal courts against environmental offenders , to examine the use of harm-based versus act-based sanctions by lower criminal and administrative courts , to assess the interactions between sanctioning decisions by lower criminal courts and the court of appeal ), and to compare the level of administrative and criminal fines imposed by lower sanctioning authorities (Blondiau et al., 2015) .
The current study uses information stored in the Environmental LawForce database to draw a picture of the differences in the criminal sanctioning of three different types of environmental offenders in the Belgian provinces of East and West Flanders. We focus on (1) companies (legal persons), (2) individuals prosecuted for acts committed as part of their professional activities (hereafter 'professional individuals'), and (3) individuals prosecuted for acts committed as part of their private lives (hereafter 'private individuals'). Particularly, we assess the similarities and differences between sanctions imposed on companies 5 versus sanctions imposed on professional individuals, since both types of offenders are engaged in business activities, and between sanctions imposed on professional individuals versus sanctions imposed on private individuals, since both categories of offenders are natural persons. This research approach is related to the recommendation formulated by Fortney (2003) and White (2010) to use tailored enforcement approaches based on organisation type and that 'distinctions need to be drawn between one-off offenders and repeat offenders, between the large corporation and the negligent employee, and so on' (White, 2010, p.374) .
Besides being well documented, the environmental sanctioning policy of Flemish criminal courts has merits that make it interesting as a yardstick in the EU-context. First, the criminal sanctioning track is more frequently used and better developed in Belgium, and especially Flanders, than in other EU countries (Faure & Svatikova, 2012) . Second, the sanctioning practice provides information on the sanctioning of natural as well as legal persons.
Indeed, legal persons became criminally liable in Belgium in 1999 and can be prosecuted and punished together with natural persons involved in the same criminal case. This situation matches the predominant situation in the EU Member States (Vermeulen et al., 2012) . Third, the sanctioning practice documents the use of an array of criminal sanctions including, besides the classical punitive sanctions, remedial sanctions and the forfeiture of illegally acquired benefits, reflecting EU policy views on this crucial point.
The remainder of the text is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model in order to derive four hypotheses regarding possible similarities and differences in the 5 White (2010) also mentions tailored enforcement approaches based on organisation type.
sanctioning decision of different offender types: companies, professional individuals and private individuals. Section 3 provides essential background on the criminal sanctioning system in Belgium. Section 4 presents the dataset used in this study. Section 5 describes the environmental sanctioning decisions made by criminal courts in East and West Flanders.
Section 6 tests the hypotheses derived in Section 2 by comparing sanctioning decisions against the three noted types of offenders. Section 7 concludes.
A Simplified Model
To understand the determinants and levels of penalties for environmental offenses, we look at the compliance decisions by firms and individuals as well as the enforcement decisions by the regulator [see Becker (1968) and Harford (1978) ].
Compliance decisions
First, we turn to the compliance decision of a rational cost-minimizing actor who is confronted with environmental regulation. This actor selects the level of violation,
minimizes the sum of all costs associated with the environmental regulation in place, TC.
Compliance costs, C(v), are assumed to be a continuously decreasing function of the size of violation, v. The expected violation costs are determined by the probability that the violation is detected, p, and by the size of the violation costs, V(v), which are assumed to be continuously increasing in the level of the violation, v.
6 Violation costs consist of many aspects, including monetary sanctions, reputational effects, and clean-up requirements, so violations costs are defined as all negative consequences associated with a violation (Rousseau, 2009) . Given this structure, the actor chooses violation level, v*, that minimizes the sum of compliance costs and expected violation costs:
The actor fully complies with the regulation if the costs of doing so are lower than or equal to the expected violation costs for all levels of violation:
If inequality (2) does not hold, the actor decides to violate the regulation and selects a level of violation, 0 v  , such that the marginal compliance cost equals the marginal expected violation cost:
Regulator's sanctioning decision
Next, we investigate the regulator's determination of the optimal sanction level, S(v), which represents a fixed proportion, a, of violation costs: S(v)=aV (v) . What type and level of sanction is optimal crucially depends on the objective function of the regulator (e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, 2000; Cohen, 1987) . We focus briefly on two important objective functions for the regulator: (i) social welfare maximization and (ii) deterrence maximization.
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Social welfare maximization, on the one hand, implies that the regulator balances compliance costs against environmental damages, D(v). Thus, in equilibrium, marginal compliance costs should equal marginal damages. The regulator can obtain this equilibrium by choosing a sanction that reflects marginal damages adjusted for the probability of sanctioning:
This social welfare maximization objective implies a damage-based approach to environmental enforcement (Polinsky & Shavell, 1994) since the sanction imposed on violators is based upon the level of damages caused by the violation. This implication leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: If the judge aims to maximize social welfare, offenders that have caused similar environmental harm should receive similar monetary sanctions, assuming a uniform probability of detection. In general, the optimal monetary sanction depends positively on harm and negatively on the probability of detection.
Maximizing deterrence, on the other hand, implies that the costs associated with violating the rules should always be larger than the cost of compliance, as shown in expression (3). The avoided cost of compliance then represents the gain to the violator from breaking the law. This insight is expressed in a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2: If the judge aims to maximize deterrence, offenders with similar gains from non-compliance should receive similar monetary sanctions, assuming a uniform probability of detection. In general, the optimal monetary sanction depends positively on the gain from noncompliance and negatively on the probability of detection.
Moreover, in order to maximise future deterrence, it is important to minimize the probability of repeat offenses. Note that postponing or imposing conditional sanctions may be more effective in minimizing the probability of repeat offenses for a given type of offense, (Polinsky & Shavell, 1991) . This insight generates a fourth hypothesis: Overall, the outlined theory reveals that the judge should treat the three identified groups of offenders uniformly unless key elements differ. In the next sections we confront these theoretical insights with data on criminal sanctioning practices in Belgium.
8 Note that the preventive dimension of verdict postponement and suspended sanctions can be easily combined with the widespread interpretation of these sanctioning options as measures of leniency. This preventive aspect, which is also recognized by policy practice (e.g. European Commission, 2004) , is reflected in our third hypothesis. 9 While the number of different non-monetary sanctions imposed on individuals and corporations may differ, our study does not examine the number of non-monetary sanctions types used by judges. Instead our study examines the frequency of use.
Background on the Criminal Sanctioning System in Belgium
This section provides an overview of the most relevant characteristics of the Belgian criminal sanctioning system (see Billiet, 2014) . We limit the information to the law that was applicable when the recorded criminal cases were handled by the courts.
Belgian criminal court judges enjoy huge discretion over their sanctioning decisions.
Importantly, sentencing guidelines do not exist in Belgian criminal law. Criminal judges are not bound by the public prosecutors' sanctioning requests. Moreover, criminal judges are not constrained by the sanctions imposed in previous cases. The decisions they make, case by case, thus represent de facto policy development.
Criminal court judges can shape sanctioning policy in the 8% 10 of environmental files that reach the bench in the following realms. If facts and liability are proven, which happens in nine out of ten cases (Billiet et al., 2009) , the judges' first decision involves the choice between a postponement of conviction and an actual conviction. Postponement of conviction 11 basically represents a choice not to punish and includes a probationary period of one to five years in which the offender must not re-offend.
When the criminal court opts for a conviction, its second decision concerns sanctions.
The court needs to impose at least one principal sanction. Belgian criminal law offers three principal sanctions: imprisonment, fine, and community service (Van den Wyngaert, 2009).
Each sanction is punitive in character. The imposition of multiple principal sanctions is legally possible and quite common .
For each imposed principal sanction, the judge also needs to determine a sanction level that lies between the legal minima and maxima. The ranges between minimum and maximum levels are typically very large. The statutes reflected in the Environmental LawForce dataset provide for fines ranging from a minimum of 26€ to a maximum of 10,000,000€ and for prison sentences with a minimum of eight days and maxima ranging from one year (e.g., the
Environmental Permitting Decree) to five years (e.g., the Waste Decree).
12 10 Some 60% of Flemish environmental cases end with a dismissal and 14% with a settlement (Billiet et al., 2010) . About half of the dismissals involve a technical reason, such as lack of evidence, while the other dismissals are based on policy reasons, such as regularisation of the offense. 11 The postponement of conviction implies that the defendant is found guilty but that the judge suspends the official verdict of the conviction for one to five years (i.e. the probationary period). If the defendant is convicted during this probationary for other criminal facts, the postponement will be revoked and the defendant will still be convicted for the original crime. 12 In Belgium, the fine amounts mentioned in legislation are multiplied by a legal correction factor ("opdeciemen") to counter the effects of monetary depreciation. This correction factor equalled 5 between 2002 and 2004, 5.5 between 2005 and 2011 , and has equalled 6 since 2012. The minimum and maximum fines mentioned do not reflect this factor.
A further core option of the criminal court relates to the possibility to suspend sanction execution, either partially or completely. Similar to a postponement of a verdict, a suspension always includes a probationary period of one to five years. Criminal legal doctrine classifies both postponement and suspension as "favors", representing expressions of leniency. Yet it should be stressed that both sanctioning options put strong emphasis on specific deterrence.
Indeed, after a postponement, an offender who does not relapse during the probationary period will escape conviction for the offense in question. Similarly, following a suspension, an offender who does not relapse will not bear the imposed sanction. However, if the offender does relapse during probation, he/she will be convicted in the case of postponement or bear the sanction in the case of suspension. Unlike postponement, suspension is a widespread option in the sanctioning possibilities of criminal courts throughout the EU, where it is commonly seen as a means to prevent recidivism (European Commission, 2004) .
Finally, once the criminal court decided to impose at least one principal sanction, suspended or not, it can also impose one or more additional sanctions. The additional sanctions can be punitive or remedial, with the remedial ones typically aiming to stop or at least mitigate further damage to the environment. The most common additional sanctions are the forfeiture of illegally acquired benefits, waste removal orders, and the injunction to cease a business operation for safety reasons. Forfeiture of illegally acquired benefits fits with the widespread belief that "crime should not pay" (e.g., Bowles et al., 2005) . Under Belgian law, this sanction can only be imposed if explicitly requested by the public prosecutor.
The only decisive factor in the determination of the sanctioning decision is the criterion of proportionality with 'the seriousness of the offense', which indicates that the criminal judge must punish 'in proportion to the seriousness of the offense'. This basic sentencing criterion, developed by the Belgian Supreme Court, applies to all types of criminal cases. It includes two sub-criteria: (1) the objective gravity of facts, which is rated by the extent to which the unlawful activities harmed or might have harmed the public interest, and (2) the culpability of the defendant.
Individuals, as well as legal persons, who consider themselves harmed by the offense under consideration, can become a civil party in a criminal case. Such legal persons acting as a civil party include public authorities and administrations. If a defendant is convicted, the judge will also rule on civil claims and, if necessary, award damages. (745). The courts in Gent and Dendermonde dealt with the largest share of cases, each roughly one third of the total environmental case load. The subsequent sub-sections explore the characteristics of the defendants in the three groups, then we look at the offense characteristics, and finally we assess trial outcomes. 13 The database is available on the website www.environmental-lawforce.be.
Description of the

Defendant characteristics
The companies and professional individuals prosecuted between 2003 and 2006 belong to a variety of sectors (Table 1) . The three most represented sectors to which the prosecuted companies belonged are manufacturing (20%), construction (16%), and wholesale and retail trade (15%). Looking at the prosecuted professionals, the three most represented sectors are agriculture (25%), accommodation and food services (18%), and wholesale and retail trade (14%). 
Offense characteristics
The types of laws breached differ across cases. Not surprising, more than half of companies (55%) were prosecuted for breaches of the Environmental Permitting Decree (EPD), which regulates the permitting obligations and permitting conditions for many polluting activities in Flanders, while 19% of companies were charged for breaches of the Waste Decree.
As with companies, almost half of professional individuals (43%) were prosecuted for breaches of the EPD, while 20% faced charges for breaches of the Waste Decree, 16% for breaches of the Manure Decree, and 11% for breaches of the Ordinance on Noise Levels. Looking at private individuals, more than half of them (64%) were prosecuted for breaches of the Waste Decree, indicating that waste dumping and littering remain common practice. Additionally, noteworthy fractions of offenses relate to the EPD (13%) and to the Ordinance on Noise Levels (6%). The amount of prosecutions for breaches of the EPD is surprising at first blush. However, some private individuals might be unofficially involved in activities, such as waste storage, that are regulated by the EPD. Similar to the type of laws breached, offenses caused different types of pollution. Note that one offense can cause more than one type of pollution. For instance, the occurrence of soil pollution and that of groundwater pollution are often positively correlated.
Defendants caused noise pollution, waste pollution, or water pollution most frequently (Table   2 ). Waste pollution dominated cases of prosecuted private individuals (68%). Additional information is available on the degree of harm caused by environmental offenses. As one indicator, the presence of civil parties implies some form of (perceived) nuisance or damage caused by the defendant. In cases against 22% of prosecuted companies, one or more civil parties joined the public prosecutor indicating greater damage than in cases lacking a civil party. At least one civil party joined the public prosecutor's case against 15% of the professional individuals as well as against 15% of private individuals. As a second indicator, the risk of health damage stemming from the prosecuted offense was explicitly mentioned by the court in its sentence in 11% of the cases involving company defendants and 10% of the cases against professionals, while this fraction dropped to 2% of the cases involving private individuals as defendants.
Trial outcomes
Given these case details, our analysis turns to an assessment of the trial outcomes. We assess the outcomes of the trials for each of the defendants separately, even if these defendants are jointly prosecuted in one case. All accusations are considered jointly to reach one verdict per defendant. Judges acquit the charges brought against 14 % of the prosecuted companies, postponed the verdict for 14%, and convicted 72% (Table 3) . Judges convicted a higher portion of prosecuted private individuals than prosecuted professionals and companies: 82% versus 71% and 72%, respectively. In contrast, judges postponed the verdict for a clearly lower portion of prosecuted private individuals than prosecuted professionals and companies: 7% versus 17% and 14%, respectively. The relatively low level of fines imposed on companies, as well as individual offenders, is noteworthy. Overall, small fines are relatively more frequent than large fines. Assuming that gains to the offenders can be substantial and knowing that the probability of being detected, prosecuted, and sanctioned is small (Svatikova, 2012) , 16 these low levels can raise questions about the deterrence generated by fines. Still, even the imposition of small fines might be sufficient to induce compliance with environmental regulation if the relevant authorities implement a state-dependent enforcement strategy. Under this type of strategy, compliant and non-compliant entities are treated differently: a targeted group of 'bad eggs' receive greater scrutiny for a defined period of time, thus, increasing the expected sanction magnitude during this period of time (Harrington, 1988 Svatikova (2012) generates a rough estimate of the average probability of detection and prosecution of less than 1% for those firms that are monitored by the Flemish Environmental Inspectorate. The inspections of the Flemish Environmental Inspectorate target the (possibly) most polluting firms, giving them higher priority in inspection efforts. Reasonably, the probability of detection and prosecution for offenses committed by firms given lower priority in inspection efforts is smaller. The same logic applies to private offenders. of more than 6 months had a chance to be executed . Thus, of the 104 prison terms issued by judges, only 12 were executed. On average, the judge-issued initial term was only 4.3 months and the effective term was 1.9 months for private individuals and was fairly similar for professionals (4.5 months and 1.7 months respectively). Based on maximum prison sentences of 1 to 5 years, the judge-issued prison terms seem quite small. Thirdly, we examine the use of forfeitures of illegally acquired benefits. This sanction was imposed for 17% of the convicted companies, 8% of the convicted professionals, and 1% of the convicted private individuals (Table 5) (Table 5) . Thus judges seized smaller amounts of illegal benefits from convicted professionals than from companies.
In the case of private individuals, the illegal benefits typically reflect the avoided costs of legal waste disposal. Clearly the monetary impact of the forfeiture is potentially much greater than the impact of fines, due to the much higher amounts involved in practice. The difference between fine amounts and forfeiture amounts does not follow from maximum limits provided by the law. The forfeiture amounts are legally limited to the gross benefit generated by the offense; therefore, they vary according to the offenses involved. The fine levels imposed in practice lie far below the legally allowed maxima, which typically range from several hundred thousand to several million euros.
Finally, we discuss the use of remedial sanctions, which aim to stop further damage to the environment. Approximately 21% of the convicted defendants received a remedial sanction for each of the three groups (Table 4) . For the convicted companies these sanctions mainly addressed waste clean-up (16) or involved an injunction ordering facility closure (23).
Similarly, for the convicted professionals, the remedial sanctions addressed waste clean-up (45) or involved an injunction ordering facility closure (43). However, for convicted private individuals, 86 of a majority of these remedial sanctions addressed waste clean-up (86%), while 11 involved facility closure (e.g., closure of the illegal waste disposal activities), and 29 involved site restoration (Table 4) . 
Evidence of the theoretical predictions
The outlined theory reveals that the courts should treat the three identified groups of offenders uniformly unless key elements differ. While our initial set of empirical findings do not control for variation in key elements, these findings establish a useful foundation. By conditioning our analysis on key elements, we can examine the empirical evidence supporting or rejecting our four hypotheses formulated in sub-section 2.2.
General observations gleaned from initial assessment
Our initial empirical findings summarize as follows. Judges postpone the verdict more often for companies and professional individuals than for private individuals.
Further, judges impose fines on all three defendant types at a very similar rate. Yet judges suspend fines partly or completely more often for companies and professionals than for private individuals. Based on median values, judges impose roughly similarly sized fines, in absolute terms, on the three defendant types even though the company median fine is more than three times the private individual median fine. Still, based on mean values, judges clearly impose the highest fines on companies and the lowest fines on private individuals with professionals in between.
While judges impose prison sentences reasonably similarly on professional and private individuals, they suspend prison terms partially or completely more often for professional individuals. Judges sentence professional and private individuals to reasonably similar prison terms at least in absolute terms.
Moreover, judges impose more frequently a forfeiture of illegal benefits on companies than on professional individuals, while rarely inflicting this monetary sanction on private individuals. Judges seize much larger amounts of illegal benefits from companies, with the amounts seized from individuals -professional or private -representing only a tiny fraction in comparison.
Finally, judges impose remedial sanctions on the three defendant types at a very similar rate and only rarely require community service.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis H1
To test Hypothesis H1, we must control for variation in environmental harm. Since we lack a direct measure, we employ two proxies. As the first, we claim that the presence of a civil party indicates a more homogenous type of environmental harm than the absence of a civil party. Consequently, we control for variation in harm by dividing our sample into two subsamples based on the presence or absence of a civil party 17 . As the second proxy, we claim that violations of a certain law generate similar levels of environmental harm. Consequently, we divide our sample into three sub-samples based on these groups of laws: waste law, noise law, and "other" laws. For each proxy, we assess the levels of fine and forfeiture of illegal benefits for the three pairings: (1) facility versus professional individual, (2) facility versus private individual, and (3) professional versus private individual. We test the hypothesis using Sample Means T-tests (Table 6 ). To substantiate our hypothesis, we need to find that both groups in the pairings receive similarly seized sanctions. When controlling for the presence/absence of a civil party, the test statistics demonstrate that offender groups are treated 17 As mentioned in Section 3, natural as well as legal persons can be a civil party, and the legal persons can include public authorities and administrations. In our dataset, the fact that a civil party is a natural person typically signals the presence of harm caused by hindrances (e.g., noise, vibrations, dust, odour, light). When the civil party is a legal person, the harm extends to other types of pollution. Public authorities tend to claim damages that cover clean-up costs such as for waste removal but also for more diffuse pollution such as surface water and soil pollution. Note that the majority of civil parties are natural persons.
differently except in one case: facilities and private individuals are fined similarly in the presence of a civil party (Table 6 ). Otherwise, facilities face higher fines and forfeitures than both professional and private individuals, yet private individuals face higher fines and forfeitures than professional individuals. When controlling for the type of violated law, test statistics support highly similar conclusions (Table 6 ). Generally, facilities face higher fines and forfeitures than individuals, while private individuals face higher fines and forfeitures than professional individuals. However, for noise law violations, facilities face fines similar to both professional and private individuals, and for waste law violations, facilities face smaller forfeitures than private individuals. Overall, little evidence supports Hypothesis H1, indicating that judges seem to assess similar types of harm differently depending on the type of offender.
Considering the more stringent sanctioning of facilities, it seems possible that the assessment of harm by judges is partly influenced by facilities' relatively higher financial means. Prof. vs Private Civil party present +*** 0 -*** +*** +*** -*** Civil party absent +*** +*** -*** +*** +*** -*** Waste law +*** +*** -*** +*** -** -*** Noise law 0 0 -*** +*** +*** -*** Other law +*** +*** -*** +*** +*** -*** "+": the first listed group receives a higher sanction than the second listed group. "-": the first listed group receives a lower sanction than the second listed group. "0": the first and second listed groups receive similarly sized sanctions. **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Hypothesis H2
To test Hypothesis H2, we must control for variation in gains from non-compliance.
Since we lack a direct measure, we implement this control by employing this proxy: whether or not the public prosecutor requested the forfeiture of illegal gains. As with Hypothesis H1, we compare the three pairings of offender groups by using Sample Means T-tests (Table 7) .
To support H2, we should find that the paired groups receive similarly seized sanctions. Test statistics demonstrate that the three groups indeed face similarly sized fines and forfeitures when the public prosecutor requests forfeiture. In contrast, both facilities and private individuals face higher fines than professionals when the public prosecutor requests no
forfeiture; yet facilities and private individuals face similarly sized fines. Overall, evidence supporting Hypothesis H2 is fairly persuasive. Forfeiture not requested by public prosecutor +*** 0 -** n/a n/a n/a "+": the first listed group receives a higher sanction than the second listed group. "-": the first listed group receives a lower sanction than the second listed group. "0": the first and second listed groups receive similarly sized sanctions. **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Hypothesis H3
Again we control for variation in gains from non-compliance by employing the proxy whether or not the public prosecutor requested the forfeiture of illegal gains. We compare the pairings of offender groups by using Sample Means T-tests (Table 8) .
To support H3, we should find that postponement and suspension are used more frequently against facilities and professionals than against private individuals. Test statistics demonstrate that the three groups have a similar chance of postponement and suspension when the public prosecutor requests
forfeiture. Yet, when the public prosecutor requests no forfeiture, the judge is more likely to postpone the verdict or to suspend the sanction against facilities and professionals as compared to private individuals. Overall, evidence supporting Hypothesis H3 is fairly good. Forfeiture not requested by public prosecutor 0 +*** +*** 0 +*** +*** "+": the first listed group has a higher ratio than the second listed group. "-": the first listed group has a lower ratio than the second listed group. "0": the first and second listed groups receive similarly sized ratios. **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Hypothesis H4
We again control for variation in environmental harm by employing the type of violated law as a proxy (Table 9) . For all pairings, we assess the frequency of remedial sanctions using "+": the first listed group is more likely to receive the sanction than the second listed group. "-": the first listed group is less likely to receive the sanction than the second listed group. "0: the first and second listed groups are similarly likely to receive the sanction. **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, two findings deserve attention: the judges' generation of specific deterrence through a postponement of the verdict and suspension of the execution of a sanction, and the judges' use of monetary sanctions. While our dataset consists of the environmental case law only in East and West Flanders, we claim that our findings should generalize to the entire Flemish Region.
As our test results for hypothesises H1, H2 and H3 indicate, judges generally aim at deterrence when sanctioning rather than punishing according to harm. However, when sanctioning professional offenders, companies as well as professional individuals, they appear to attach far more importance to specific deterrence than when sanctioning private individuals.
Indeed, when sentencing professional offenders, judges use relatively more frequently a postponement of the verdict (see Table 3 ) as well as a suspension of the execution of fines (see Tables 4 and 8 ) and, in the case of professional individuals, prison sentences (see Table 4 ).
Overall, these choices reveal a sanctioning policy where the sanction acts as both stick and carrot. With this perspective in mind, why might judges see such a sanctioning policy as a fitting one when punishing professional offenders, yet consider it distinctly less fitting when punishing private offenders? The use of legal counsel offers one explanation. Private individuals tend to be less likely to hire a lawyer than professionals. The professional context offers a second explanation. Ongoing economic activities include a permanent risk of new breaches of environmental legislation, which may be relatively damaging. The likelihood of detection and prosecution offers a third explanation. Business facilities and factories most often operate on well-defined locations. Thus, considering all kinds of offenses, the link to a particular offender is more easily established for companies and professional individuals than for private individuals, enhancing the probability of detection and prosecution when these types of offenders re-offend. In contrast, the characteristics of the main offenses committed by private individuals, namely waste littering and dumping, are notably different. These offenses can be committed anywhere and the identification of the offender depends on chance circumstances, such as catching him/her in the act or finding evidence in the abandoned waste that identifies the perpetrator.
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The judges' use of monetary sanctions is puzzling. Fines are small to very small, especially those imposed on companies. Given these steadily low fine levels, the amounts of forfeited benefits bear attention. Regarding companies, it is striking that these amounts rise to levels many times as high as the fine levels (see Table 5 ). Judges somehow decide more easily to inflict a high forfeiture of illegal benefits than a high fine. This finding adds an interesting dimension to the obvious complementarity between both monetary sanctions.
Finally, we offer some concluding policy remarks. First, Flemish criminal court judges impose fines that seem small relative to the costs of conducting a criminal case (see Table 5 ).
As a case in point, Rousseau and Proost (2005) provide a rough estimate of the average costs of imposing a criminal fine in Flanders at 13,600 € per imposed fine. This said, the forfeiture of illegally acquired benefits strongly tilts this scale in the 75 cases where imposed. Still the availability of alternative means of punitive sanctioning, especially administrative fining, is interesting to consider (e.g., Faure and Svatikova, 2012; Blondiau et al., 2015) . In 2009 18 To support this point, we refer to the Milieuhandhavingsrapport 2015 of the Flemish Region (Vlaamse Hoge Raad voor Ruimte en Milieu, 2016). The report mentions the percentages of technical dismissals due to the absence of an identified offender for different categories of offenses. In 2015, this type of technical dismissal amounted to 5.3% for environmental permit offenses by companies (infringements of the permit duty and infringements of exploitation conditions such as emission standards). In that same year, technical dismissals due to the lack of identified offender reached 23% for nature conservation offenses (habitat and wildlife crime) and 18.5% for waste offenses (including littering).
administrative fining for environmental offenses has been introduced in Flanders. Sanctioning through administrative fines should lower sanctioning costs since the set of legal actors is smaller. If the administrative fining authority is specialized in environmental crime, which is a reasonable assumption as specialization is a common feature of administrative fining authorities, this lowers the costs even more because of the increased efficiency in data processing.
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Second, when adjusting the design of existing criminal sanctioning tools or designing new sanctioning tools, the legislator should systematically consider the different types of offenders, especially professional versus private individuals. Diversity of sanctioning tools gives judges better chances to tailor sanction packages according to the offenders' characteristics, as is illustrated by the differentiated use of the suspension of sanctions, the forfeiture of illegal benefits (see Tables 4, 7 , 8 and 9).
Third, Flemish criminal court judges impose fines that seem small (see Table 5 ), especially since we suspect that the costs of complying with environmentally related laws can be substantial and that the probabilities of detection and sanctioning are limited. If indeed a large difference lies between the costs of non-compliance and the costs of compliance, we would argue in favour of higher fine levels in Flanders to effectively deter environmental crimes. This said, we acknowledge that even relatively small fines may still induce compliance in the presence of sufficiently strong risk averse preferences, sufficiently great reputational costs associated with the imposition of fines, sufficiently large exposure to third party liability, state-dependent enforcement strategies, or sufficiently meaningful intrinsic motivations to comply with environmental protection laws. Note that imposing these higher fines would not require higher statutory maxima since these currently reach several million euros.
Fourth, forfeiture of illegal benefits represents a useful type of monetary sanction. Based on simple economic logic, a single euro extracted from a convicted defendant whether from the imposition of a fine or a forfeiture should generate the same level of deterrence. Of course, the difference in labels may generate differences in reputational costs, third party liability exposure, or displacement of intrinsic motivation to comply. In this broader sense, judges need to evaluate the full extent of a euro extracted using a fine versus a euro extracted through forfeiture. The obvious complementarity between forfeiture of illegal benefits and fines is strengthened by the observation that judges quite easily inflict forfeitures for relatively high 19 In Europe, differences in proof requirements should not lower the costs of administrative fining relative to criminal fining. Based upon its interpretation of the presumption of innocence, the European Court of Human Rights imposes the same standard of proof for all punitive sanctions, regardless of their criminal or administrative nature, namely the standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt".
amounts, a decision that seems harder to make for a fine (see Table 5 ). As one explanation, judges might be reluctant to impose higher fine levels due to their assessment of the proportionality criterion, whereas these same judges might feel comfortable with the idea that 'crime should not pay' (e.g., Bowles et al., 2005) . Regardless of the reason behind the discrepancy in the use of fines and forfeitures, the latter sanction offers a welcome complement to low fine levels, especially when sanctioning companies. As a monetary sanction that offers a complement to fines, the forfeiture of illegal benefits deserves a place in the set of criminal sanctioning tools designed to punish environmental crime.
Last but not least, when given the possibility, criminal judges use remedial sanctions against environmental crime (see Tables 4 and 9 ). Whereas such sanctions traditionally belong to the realm of administrative enforcement, it appears worthwhile to incorporate them in criminal enforcement too.
